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I. WHERE TWO WORLDS MEET
1 In the past, the worlds of (European) competition law and arbitration law have 
collided on numerous occasions.1 Suffice it to refer to the following issues to demonstrate 
the extent of this collision 2 :
- can an arbitrator make a reference arbitrators for preliminary rulings to the ECJ 
to obtain some clarification on a disputed point of EU competition law ? 3
- can an arbitral award be challenged before national courts if it appears that the 
arbitrators have neglected to apply some EU competition rules ? (the infamous 
Eco-swiss case) 4
- Can arbitrators determine whether an exemption under Article 81(3) would most 
likely have been granted by the Commission ? 5
Both  the  competition  and  the  arbitration  worlds  answer  to  their  own  logic.  These 
examples of collisions have touched some raw nerves in the past. The confrontation may 
have fostered a better understanding of two separate worlds, which in the past did not 
always understand each other and each other’s approach.
2 It had long been thought that, of all EU competition processes, merger regulation 
was immune from arbitration /  or  at  least  that  arbitration  could  play  no  role  in  such 
clearing processes. This has changed dramatically over the last few years.
1See generally, W. ABDELGAWARD, L’arbitrage et droit de la concurrence, Paris, LGDJ, 2001.
2For  recent  accounts  of  the relationships  between the two worlds,  see  H.  LESGUILLONS,  “La  solitude 
pondérée de l’arbitre face au droit de la concurrence”, Cahiers de l’arbitrage in Gazette du Palais, mai 
2003, 17-23 and L. IDOT, « Arbitration and the Reform of Regulation 17/62 », in European Competition 
Law Annual 2001 : Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law,  C.-D. EHLERMANN, Hart, Oxford, 
2003, 307-321.
3See the Nordsee ruling of the ECJ, 23 March 1982, case 102/81, E.C.R., 1982, 1095.
4See A. MOURRE, « Les rapports de l’arbitrage et du droit communautaire après l’arrêt Eco Swiss de la 
CJCE », Recueil des Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 77 ; R. VON MEHREN, « The Eco-Swiss Case and International 
Arbitration »,  Arbitration  Intl.,  2003,  465-469 ;  N.  SHELKOPLYAS,  « European  Community  Law  and 
International Arbitration : Logics that Clash » Eur. Business Organization L. Rev., 2002, 569-591.
5See e.g. ICC Arbitral award N° 10246, discussed by E. JOLIVET, “Chronique de jurisprudence arbitrale de 
la  Chambre  de  commerce  internationale  (CCI).  Quelques  exemples  du  traitement  du  droit 
communautaire dans l’arbitrage CCI », Cahiers de l’arbitrage in Gazette du Palais, mai 2003, (3), 7-8.
Starting  in  2000,  the  European Commission  accepted,  albeit  reluctantly,  to  consider 
behavioural commitments made by merging entities. In the past, the Commission had 
considered  that  such commitments  were  not  adequate  to  ensure  competitive  market 
structures. Following a decision of the Court of First Instance in the Gencor/Lonrho case,6 
the  Commission  was  forced  to  accept  behavioural  commitments  next  to  structural 
commitments (such as divestments).7
Compliance with structural remedies can be monitored fairly easily by the Commission. 
Structural  commitments  entail  mostly  divestments  needed  to  maintain  an  acceptable 
level of competition. Such divestments are required to be made within a short period of 
time. The Commission customarily appoints a trustee (‘Monitoring Trustee’ or ‘Divestiture 
Trustee’) to look after the commitments.8
Behavioural  commitments,  however,  require  more  extensive  monitoring,  since  they 
concern the future behaviour of the merged entity. A typical behavioural commitment 
would  require  the  merged  entity  to  continue  supplies  to  a  third  party  on  a  non-
discriminatory basis. Monitoring these commitments is time consuming and the Merger 
Task Force (MTF) does not have the necessary resources to do so – even though the 
MTF has recently created an ‘enforcement unit’.
3 One of the solutions favoured by the MTF to monitor compliance with these new 
commitments, was to impose an arbitration agreement to the merged entity. Practice of 
Commission : arbitration is provided as a dispute resolution mechanism in the context of 
such behavioural commitments.
The first such reference to arbitration in a commitment, is to be found in a 1992 decision 
concerning Elf Aquitaine.9 Since 2000, references to arbitration have become more and 
more frequent.
The Südzucker case provides a typical example of this practice. This German company 
acquired sole control of a large French competitor, Saint Louis Sucre S.A. The merger 
gave rise to substantial concerns, since Südzucker was already one of the world’s largest 
producer of sugar. The Commission concluded that the dominant position of Südzucker 
would be substantially strengthened and required commitments to restore competition.
Besides some divestments, Südzucker was required to undertake to sell to competing 
sugar manufacturers interested in making supplies to the Southern part of Germany, a 
quantity of up to 90.000 tons of sugar per year. To ensure compliance, Südzucker was 
required  to  conclude  a  framework  agreement.  Within  that  agreement,  Südzucker 
committed  to  arbitrate  any  dispute  which  could  arise  with  a  third  party  competitor, 
particularly in respect of the pricing. The arbitration agreement read as follows :
6CFI, 25 March 1999, Gencor v. Commission [1999] ECR II-753, in particular § 319 : “The categorisation 
of  a  proposed  commitment  as  behavioural  or  structural  is  therefore  immaterial.  It  is  true  that 
commitments which are structural in nature, such as commitment to reduce the market share of the 
entity arising from a concentration by the sale of a subsidiary, are, as a rule, preferable from the point of 
view of the Regulation’s objective, inasmuch as they prevent once and for all, or at least for some time, 
the emergence or strengthening of the dominant position previously identified by the Commission and 
do  not,  moreover,  require  medium or  long-term monitoring  measures.  Nevertheless,  the  possibility 
cannot automatically be ruled out that commitments which prima facie are behavioural, for instance not 
to use a trademark for a certain period, or to make part of the production capacity of the entity arising 
from the  concentration  available  to  third-party  competitors,  or,  more  generally,  to  grant  access  to 
essential  facilities  on  non-discriminatory  terms,  may  themselves  also  be  capable  of  preventing  the 
emergence or strengthening of a dominant position”.
7The Notice on Remedies Acceptable under Regulation EEC N° 4064/89.
8For  more  details,  see  MARC BLESSING,  Arbitrating  Antitrust  and  Merger  Control  Issues,  Helbing  & 
Lichtenhahn, 2003, 71 ff. and the Best Practice Guidelines for Divestiture Commitments, of 2 May 2003.
9Decision of the Commission Case N° IV/M.235 of 4 September 1992, Elf Aquitaine – Thyssen / Minol.
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“Südzucker wird mit dem Händler einen Rahmenlieferungsvertrag abschliessen, 
der diesen berechtigtn eine Menge von bis zu 90.000 t pro Jahr u beziehen. In  
dem Rahmenlieferungsvertrag  ist  eine  Scheidsklausel  verzusehen,  auf  Grund 
derer der Händler im Streitfalll  die vorherige oder nachträgliche Entscheidung  
eines Scheidsgerichts darüber herbeiführen kann, ob die von Südzucker über die  
Interventionspreis  hinaus  berechneten  Kosten  unter  Beachtung  der  Ziffer  16  
dieser Zusage gerechtfertigt sind. Südzucker wird den Händler nach einemn von 
diesem jährlich zum 15. September zu erstellenden Abrufplan beliefern, in dem 
die  voraussichtlichen  Mengen,  Quälitaten  Verpackungstypen  und  Lieferwerke 
aufgeführt sind”.10
4 Since then arbitration agreements have been included to ensure compliance with 
commitments made, among other, in the airline industry,11 in the media industry,12 and in 
the spirits industry.13 Over the past few years,  the practice of including an arbitration 
agreement in the commitment letter has rapidly grown.14 The new Merger Regulation 15 
does not touch upon the issue of arbitration as a resolution method for difficulties with 
behavioural commitments. It is widely expected, however, that the practice of insisting 
upon arbitration as a monitoring tool, will continue after the new Regulation comes into 
force on 1 May 2004.
5 Doubts  have  been  raised  concerning  the  legitimacy  of  entrusting  private 
arbitrators  with  the  power  to  assess  whether  a  merged  entity  complies  with  the 
commitments imposed by the Commission.  Ms.  Idot has expressed doubts as to the 
existence of a legal basis under European law for such a ‘delegation of powers’ by the 
Commission.16
This  question  seems  rhetorical  at  best.  Ms  Idot  does  not  actually  insist  on  this 
argument.17 Suffice  it  to  say  that,  at  this  moment,  the  practice  is  sufficiently  well 
established  that  it  deserves  to  be  investigated,  even  if  questions  could  be  asked 
regarding its legal basis.18
In this paper, we will look first at the effect this new practice may have on the position of 
third  parties  competitor  (II)  before  examining  the  exact  nature  of  this  new  field  of 
application for commercial arbitration (III).
10Appendix II to Decision of  10 December 2001, Case N° Comp./M. 2389,  O.J.C.E., C-211 of 28 July 
2001, 53.
11See Decision of 27 November 1992 in the matter of British Airways / TAT, case N° IV/M.259, O.J.E.C., 
11 December 1992, C-326 and Decision of 20 July 1995 in the matter of Swissair / Sabena II, Case N° 
IV/M.616, O.J.E.C., 4 August 1995, C-200/10.
12See Decision of 21 March 2000 in the matter of BskyB / Kirch PayTV, Case N° Comp./JV.37, O.J.E.C., 
15 April 2000, C-110/45 and Decision of 13 October 2000 in the matter of Vivendi / Canal + / Seagram, 
case N° Comp./M.2050, O.J.E.C., 31 December 2000, C-311/3.
13See Decision of 8 May 2001 in the mater of  Pernod Ricard / Diageo / Seagram Spirits,  Case N° 
Comp./M.2268, O.J.E.C., 19 January 2002, C-16/13 and Decision of 15 October 1997 in the matter of 
Guinness / Grand Metropolitan, Case N° IV/M.938, O.J.E.C., 27 October 1998, L-288/24.
14See for an overview of the different cases, CH. LIEBSCHER, “L’arbitrage dans les procédures de contrôle 
des concentrations : des perspectives », Cahiers de l’arbitrage in Gazette du Palais, mai 2003, 24-39.
15Regulation  139/2004  on  the  control  of  concentrations,  adopted  by  the  European  Council  on  20 
January 2004 (published in the Official Journal of 29 January 2004, L-24/1).
16L. IDOT, “Une innovation surprenante : l’introduction de l’arbitrage dans le contrôle communautaire des 
concentrations », Revue de l’arbitrage, 2000, (591), 598.
17Mr. Lesguillons writes that arbitration of merger commitments « does not raise ontological problems” 
(H. LESGUILLONS, art. cit., Cahiers de l’arbitrage in Gazette du Palais, mai 2003, 17).
18Mr. Liebscher convincingly argues that the practice of the Commission raises no issue of principle 
since the Commission does not delegate the jurisdiction to review the merger as such; the arbitration 
panel is only entitled to examine compliance with the commitments made to obtain clearance of the 
merger : CH. LIEBSCHER, art. cit., Gazette du Palais, mai 2003, 38-39.
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II. ARBITRATING POST-MERGER COMMITMENTS AND THIRD PARTIES
6 The practice of the Commission to impose arbitration as the dispute resolution 
method for commitments disputes raises new opportunities for third party competitors 
who may experience the drawbacks of a merger.
Before reviewing the merits and pitfalls of this new avenue (2), one should reflect on the 
very nature of the dispute resolution mechanism imposed by the MTF (1).
(1) The nature of the animal
7 The first  question  that  comes  to  mind  when  reviewing  the  dispute  resolution 
agreements imposed by the MTF as part of post-merger commitments, is to what extent 
the MTF indeed imposed arbitration as a monitoring tool.
In some instances, there is no doubt the MTF required the merged entity to submit to 
what  appears  to  be  ‘classic’  arbitration.  The  arbitration  can  be  ad  hoc  (as  in  the 
Carrefour/Promodès 19 and the  Danish Crown decisions  20).  In  several  instances, the 
Commission has accepted that disputes should be submitted to institutional arbitration 
(LCIA or ICC, see the Vivendi decision 21 – ICC – and the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan 
decision  22 - LCIA). This suggests that the MTF will  not impose any particular form of 
arbitration, or favour one arbitral institution above another, but will simply take what the 
merged entity offers, provided other requirements are met, and in particular the swiftness 
of the resolution (see  infra).  Hence, there seems to be room for the counsels of  the 
merged entity to insist on a particular form of arbitration, if the company is more at ease 
with one institution or another.
In  other  instances,  reference  was  made  to  a  more  sophisticated  dispute  resolution 
mechanism. In the Vodafone decision, the merged entity submitted undertakings aimed 
at  enabling  third  parties  non-discriminatory  access  to  the  merged  entity’s  integrated 
networks so as to provide advanced mobile services to their customers. To that end, 
Vodafone  Airtouch  suggested  to  set  up  a  so-called  Fast  Track  Dispute  Resolution 
Procedure in  order  to  solve  disagreements  between the merged entity  and the third 
parties.23 This procedure essentially consists in an obligation imposed on Vodafone to 
provide detailed written reasons for the decision that has been challenged by the third 
party. The commitment also provides for the detailed reasoning to be appreciated by an 
arbitral tribunal whose proceedings will be conducted in accordance with the rules of the 
LCIA.  This  type  of  agreement,  which  is  further  accompanied  by  a  wealth  of  details, 
certainly deviates from the traditional arbitration. It may, as has been observed, that a 
‘normal’  arbitration would not  adequately deal with the specific  issues that  may arise 
following this type of merger.24
19Decision of 25 January 2000,  Carrefour /  Promodès,  Case N° Comp./M. 1684,  O.J.E.C.,  14 June 
2000, C-64/5. The undertaking reads as follows : “Carrefour s’engage à proposer à tous les fournisseurs 
[…]  de  soumettre  les  litiges  qui  porteraient  sur  l’interprétation,  l’application  ou  l’exécution  des 
engagements de Carrefour, à un arbitre unique désigné d’un commun accord par les parties, étant 
entendu que l’arbitre sera un expert indépendant ».
20Decision of 9 March 1999,  Danish Crown / Vesjyske Slagterier,  Case N° IV/M.1313,  O.J.E.C.,  25 
January 2000, C-20/1.
21Decision of 13 October 2000,  Vivendi /  Canal + / Seagram,  Case N° Comp./M.2050,  O.J.E.C.,  31 
December 2000, C-311/3.
22Decision of 15 October 1997, Guinness / Grand Metropolitan, Case N° IV/M.938, O.J.E.C., 27 October 
1998, L-288/24.
23Decision of 12 April 2000, Vodafone Airtouch / Mannesman, Case N° Comp./M.1795, O.J.E.C., 19 
May 2000, C-141/19.
24As has been observed by  MARC BLESSING,  Arbitrating Antitrust and Merger Control Issues, Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn, 2003, 109.
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The  Shell  /  BASF / J V Nicole decision provided for a commitment in favour of third 
parties active in the resin business : the merged entity agreed to license its patent rights 
on a non-discriminating, arm’s length basis to all interested parties, with the right for such 
licensees to grant sub-licenses.25 This commitment was submitted to what may be called 
‘pendulum arbitration’,  whereby the parties agreed to submit a single proposal to the 
arbitration tribunal, which was required to decide in favour of one of these two proposals 
in its entirety.
In yet other instances, the dispute resolution mechanism imposed by the Commission is 
more difficult to characterize. In the Elf Aquitaine case, the Commission indeed imposed 
“arbitration by mutually agreed independent experts”.26 This is a rather hybrid formula, 
with gives rise to the risk that the parties first dispute the nature of the animal.27
This suggests that the Commission is not as such concerned by the classic distinction 
between expert decision and ‘real’ arbitration. The MTF is apparently interested in the 
efficiency of the dispute resolution method and not by the delicate distinctions made in 
the literature between the various types of alternative dispute resolution methods.
8 More generally, one can wonder whether the mechanism contemplated by the 
MTF really  fits  the  classic  definition  of  arbitration  as  a contractual  dispute resolution 
method,  i.e. a method agreed upon between two, or more, parties. The contract forms 
the basis, and at the same time, the limitation of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.
With  this  in  mind,  can  one  still  pretend  that  the  arbitration  clause  found  in  some 
commitment letters constitutes a real agreement to arbitrate? In most cases, there will 
not be any agreement between the merged entity and the competitor. Take the example 
of the Südzucker case : a dispute will precisely arise when Südzucker and a competitor 
do not agree on the price to be charged, or other conditions, for the sugar. Can such a 
dispute be referred to arbitration ?
This  does not  actually raise difficulties.  It  is  true that  there may not  be any contract 
between the merged entity and the third party, unlike in the classic arbitration situation. 
However,  the  arbitration  clause  to  be  found  in  the  commitment  letter  constitutes  a 
unilateral offer to arbitrate, an offer that is made erga omnes, or at least to all competitors 
concerned, to accept arbitration to resolve a particular dispute.
If the third party initiates the procedure and takes up the offer to arbitrate a dispute, the 
consent  of  both  parties  to  arbitrate  will  be  manifest.  The  arbitrators  could  take  the 
opportunity  to  record  this  consent  in  terms of  reference,  in  order  to  avoid  any  later 
dispute on their jurisdiction.
25Decision of 29 March 2000, Shell / BASF / JV Project Nicole, Case N° Comp./M.1795, O.J.E.C., 20 
May  2000,  C  142/35.  The  clause  reads  as  follows  :  “If  no  agreement  can  be  reached  on  the 
consideration for a License or Non-Assert, such disagreement will be resolved by ‘pendulum arbitration’. 
Pursuant to such arbitration, each party will  submit a single proposal for the consideration for such 
License  or  Non-Assert  to  the  arbitration  panel  which  can  only  decide  in  favour  of  one  of  the  two 
submittted proposals in its entirety.”
26Decision of the Commission Case N° IV/M.235 of 4 September 1992, Elf Aquitaine – Thyssen / Minol : 
the Decision reads as follows : “Arbitration by mutually agreed independent experts will be provided in 
cases of disputes relating to the application of the agreement”.
27This is further illustrated by the fact that some agreements provide for ICC or LCIA arbitration and at 
the  same time provide  for  a  default  appointment  of  the  presiding  arbitrator  by  a  local  judge.  See 
Decision of 8 May 2000 in the matter of Glaxo Wellcome / Smithkline Beecham, case N° Comp./M.1846, 
O.J.E.C., 20 June 2000, C-170/6, which provides that “Any dispute arising under or in connection with 
[this undertaking] shall be determined by arbitration in London pursuant to the rules of the London Court 
of International Arbitration by a single arbitrator chosen by agreement between the parties, failing which 
the arbitrator shall be chosen by the President of the Law Society of England and Wales”. Obviously, 
the jurisdiction given to the President of the Law Society cannot be reconciled with the rules of the 
LCIA… See in particular Article 5-5 of the LCIA rules.
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This is simply a new manifestation of what has been called “arbitration without privity”.28 
The arbitration provision included in most bilateral investment treaties allows investors to 
submit disputes with the host State to arbitration even though these two parties may not 
have signed a contract.29 Likewise, there may not be a contract between the merged 
entity and the third party, but provided the latter accepts the offer made by the former, in 
the  commitment  letter,  to  arbitrate  eventual  disputes,  the  arbitration  has  a  sufficient 
contractual basis.
(2) Should the third party accept the offer to arbitrate?
9 Once it  has been accepted that the commitment by the merged entity merely 
constitutes an offer to arbitrate a dispute, consideration should be given to the question 
whether the third party competitor should accept this offer.
It is obvious the third party is not required to arbitrate eventual disputes with the merged 
entity.30 This  is  merely  a  possibility offered by  the  commitment  letter.  This  begs  the 
question whether the third party should take up the offer made by the merged entity.
It is not possible to offer a general answer to this question. Given the differences existing 
between each merger,  businesses deserve a tailored made answer.  However,  a few 
pointers can be provided on the advantages offered by arbitration.
There are, indeed, strong arguments to favour arbitration as offered in the commitments 
to resolve disputes with the merged entity - besides the usual advantages of arbitration 
over litigation in state court.
10 First of all, arbitration certainly offers a neutral venue to settle the dispute. In most 
cases, parties will not (yet) be bound by a contract. This means disputes may have to be 
brought  before  the  home courts  of  the  merged entity.  It  may indeed not  always  be 
possible to attract the merged entity before the competitor’s local courts.
Against this background, arbitration may offer a better alternative. At least, the arbitration 
tribunal will provide a more neutral venue than the courts of the merged entity. In that 
respect, it is interesting to note that not all arbitration agreements define the seat of the 
arbitration  tribunal.  Even  though  most  experienced  arbitrators  will  argue  that  an 
arbitration  clause  which  does  not  define  the  seat  of  the  arbitration,  is  flawed,  it  is 
remarkable  to  note  that  the  arbitration  agreements  found in  commitment  letters  only 
rarely include details on this issue.31 It is to be hoped that future arbitration agreements 
will take care of this issue.32
Could  the  arbitration  commitment  locate  the  seat  of  the  arbitral  tribunal  outside  the 
European Union? On could think for example of Switzerland. It is doubtful whether the 
MTF will agree to this.  If the seat of the tribunal is located outside the EU, this would 
mean that the national court exercising primary control over the award, would not directly 
be  bound  by  European  law,  and  in  particular  by  the  Commission’s  decision  on  the 
28To use a phrase coined by J. PAULSSON, « Arbitration Without Privity », ICSID Review, 1995, Vol. 10/2, 
232-257.
29See e.g. Article 8(3) of the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Belgium and Burundi signed on 13 
April 1989 (Act of 19 April 1991, published in the Official Gazette of 16 September 1995).
30For this view : CH. LIEBSCHER, art. cit., Gazette du Palais, mai 2003, 39.
31In the Vivendi / Canal + / Seagram case, arbitration was to be held in London. The same was provided 
for in the Shell/DEA case.The Alcatel/Thomson decision chose for Paris (Decision of 4 June 1998 in the 
matter of Alcatel / Thomson CFS-SCS, Case N° IV/M.1185, O.J.E.C., 1 Sept. 1998, C-22-5). The Dow 
Chemical / Union Carbide provided for arbitration in Amsterdam (Decision of 3 May 2000 in the matter 
of Dow Chemical / Union Carbide, Case N° Comp./M.1671, O.J.E.C., 14 Sept. 2001, C-245/1).
32CH. LIEBSCHER, “Drafting Arbitration Clauses for EC Merger Control” J. Int’l Arbitration, 2004, (67), 73-74.
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merger. The award could therefore not be challenged on the ground that the arbitrators 
ignored one or the other provisions of European law.33 Hence, it seems better to provide 
that the arbitral tribunal will have its seat in one of the Member States.
11 The competitor will also benefit from some of the features that are most probably 
included  in  the  arbitration  agreement  at  the  Commission’s  express  request.  The 
Commission indeed ensures that the arbitration agreement be drafted in a fairly balanced 
way.
The  first  feature  of  the  arbitration  that  could  prove  favourable  to  the  competitor’s 
interests, is the tight time frame on which the Commission insists. The MTF apparently is 
very keen to ensure that possible disputes be settled very fast. Severe time limits are 
imposed for the arbitrators to conclude their mission and render an award.
In the  Alcatel/Thomson decision, the Commission imposed a fast track arbitration : the 
arbitrator was required to pronounce the award within two months.34 In other decisions, 
the Commission even required a decision within a time period of one month.35
It can be asked whether these time frames are realistic, given the nature of the arbitral 
process  and  the  need  to  respect  the  due  process.36 In  any  case,  the  requirements 
imposed by the Commission ensure that the third party competitor will obtain a decision 
within a very reasonable period of time, and often much sooner than if proceedings were 
brought before a state court. It may also be noted that the time frame imposed by the 
Commission will influence the choice of arbitrators : any potential arbitrator must indeed 
have plenty of time available in a very short period to handle the arbitration.
12 It is not common to find rules on the burden of proof in arbitration agreements. At 
most,  this  issue may be  touched upon in  terms of  reference,  if  any  such terms are 
drafted.
Some arbitration commitments found in post-merger cases depart from that finding. In 
some instances, the MTF indeed seems to have required that the arbitration commitment 
includes a precise regulation of the burden of proof of each parties. As included in some 
arbitration agreements, this regulation could ease the task of the third party competitor 
and could certainly prove very beneficial for third party competitors. In the Telia / Sonera 
case,37 a case concerning the acquisition by Telia, a Swedish telecommunications and 
cable TV operator, of Sonera, active in the mobile telephone business in Finland, the 
Commission wanted to  curtail  Telia’s  possibility  to  leverage its  strong position in  the 
mobile telecommunications services market.  To that end, the Commission imposed a 
non-discrimination  obligation  on  Telia,  for  access  by  third  party  operators  (and 
competitor) to Telia’s network. Disputes relating to this obligation were to be submitted to 
a  fast  track dispute resolution procedure that  was spelled out  in  great  details  in  the 
Decision.38
33See on this issue CH. LIEBSCHER, art.cit., J. Int’l Arbitration, 2004, (67), 74.
34Case IV/M.1185, § 38 of the Decision.
35Decision of 20 December 2001 in the matter of  Shell/DEA,  Case N° Comp./M.2389,  O.J.E.C.,  21 
January 2003, C-276/31 : the arbitration clause required the arbitrators to render their decision “within 
one month of  the appointment of  the president  of  the arbitral  tribunal”.  In  the  Vodafone Airtouch /  
Mannesmann, the decision provided that “the arbitral tribunal shall render its decision within one month 
after  nomination” (Case Comp/M.1795).  In the  Telia /  Sonera case, the decision provided that  “the 
arbitrators shall  make a decision within one month of the appointment of the third arbitrator” (Case 
Comp/M.2803, § 26 of the Annex).
36MARC BLESSING (Arbitrating Antitrust and Merger Control Issues, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2003, 170-171) 
writes that  :  “we fear that  the European Commission does not always have a realistic view on the 
requirements of procedure and the requirements of due process in arbitral proceedings”.
37Decision of 10 July 2002 in the matter of Telia / Sonera, Case N° Comp./M.2803, O.J.E.C., 24 August 
2002, C-201/19.
38Paragraphs 119, 146 and 143 et seq. of the Decision. See also Paragraphs 26 et seq of the Annex.
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Interestingly for competitors, the Decision provided that :
“The burden of proof in any dispute under the Fast Track Procedure set out in 
this Clause is as follows : (i) the requesting party must produce evidence of a 
prima facie case, and (ii) if the requesting party produces evidence of a  prima 
facie case, the arbitrator must find in favour of the requesting party, unless Telia, 
having had an opportunity to comment on evidence so produced, can produce 
evidence to the contrary”.
Similar ‘prima facie rules’ can be found in other cases.39
Needless to say, such a rule greatly facilitates the task of the competitor and will make 
arbitration under the terms of the commitment an attractive alternative to proceedings 
before state courts. It will essentially be for the merged entity to discharge the burden of 
proof. As has been argued, there is some logic in imposing the burden of proof on the 
merged entity, since this entity will have privileged access to the relevant material and 
data.40 Nonetheless, this strikes as an unusually harsh position for the merged entity. It 
may even imperil the enforceability of an award. It is indeed not excluded that a national 
court finds that the merged entity has not had its day in court, since it had to discharge 
such a heavy burden of proof.
13 To sum up, it appears that, at least in most cases, the third party competitor will 
have strong reasons to take up the offer of the merged entity to arbitrate disputes. As 
fashioned by the MTF’s requirements,  arbitration indeed offers significant  advantages 
that cannot be replicated by state courts. It is not excluded, however, to find cases where 
a third party may have specific reasons to seize such courts. One may think of the need 
to obtain urgent provisional measures. Some arbitration agreements have provided for 
the possibility for the arbitrators to hear claim for provisional measures.41 However, in 
most cases this issue has not been touched upon. Even if a party calls upon a state court 
to order some provisional measures, this will, however, not exclude to possibility to seize 
the arbitrators of the merits of the dispute.
III. ARBITRATION IN THE SHADOW OF THE MTF?
14 It has been shown that third party competitors have, on average, an interest in 
initiating arbitration proceedings as offered by the commitment letter.
What can they expect from the arbitration process? It is likely that the arbitration process 
will  differ  significantly  from  the  traditional  pattern  familiar  to  those  dealing  with 
international commercial disputes.
This is due to the fact that the arbitrator carries out, in a first stage at least, a quasi-
regulatory function in determining whether or not the commitments made by the merged 
entity have been honoured. The arbitrator is indeed required to scrutinize the fulfilment 
39The  Vodafone/Mannesman decision,  in  the  Shell/  DEA case,  and in the  Vivendi case (where the 
clause read as follows : “The burden of proof in any dispute under this Undertaking shall be as follows: 
(i) the complaining party must produce evidence of a prima facie case, and (ii) if the complaining party 
produces evidences of a prima facie case, the arbitrator must find in favour of the complaining party 
unless Universal can produce evidence to the contrary”).
40MARC BLESSING, Arbitrating Antitrust and Merger Control Issues, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2003, 175. See 
also  CH.  LIEBSCHER,  art.cit.,  J.  Int’l  Arbitration,  2004,  (67),  78 :  « This  may  indeed  be  a  suitable 
mechanism to balance a disequilibium as regards access to information ».
41See the  decisions  in  the  cases  of  Dow Chemical  /  Union  Carbide ;  Shell  /  BASF and  Alcatel  /  
Thomson.
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and  adherence  of  a  party  to  the  commitments  endorsed  vis-à-vis  the  European 
Commission.
In  this  respect,  it  may  be  said  that  the  arbitrator  works  as  the  ‘prolonged  arm and 
instrument’ of the EU Commission. His mission is not only to settle a dispute between 
private  parties,  but  also  to  further  the  policy  objectives  set  out  in  the  Commission’s 
decision. As such, this departs from the traditional adjudicatory function of arbitrators.
This has consequence on the nature of the arbitration process. Take for instance the 
classic issue of the law applicable to the merits of the dispute. This question usually 
needs to be addressed by the arbitral tribunal at an early stage of the process – unless 
the arbitrators rule as amiables compositeurs.
When  arbitrating  a  dispute  relating  to  a  post-merger  commitment,  the  issue  of  the 
applicable law loses much of its importance. The terms of the commitment are indeed 
self-explanatory and quasi self-executory.  In most case,  they will  spell  out  with great 
precision what is expected from the merged entity. Compliance with these commitments 
is a fact-driven exercise, where there is less need to resort to legal rules.
Further, the particular nature of the arbitral process will certainly influence the selection of 
the arbitrators. Competition law issues tend to concern highly complex factual situations, 
with a heavy dose of economic reasoning. It is obvious that settling disputes of this kind 
requires specific expertise in the field of competition law. Further, as already underlined, 
the Commission insists on a swift decision by the arbitrators, and impose very tight time 
limits. This means that the arbitrator must have plenty of time available in a very short 
period to handle the arbitration.42
15 It is true that, in a second stage, the arbitrators may be called upon to focus on 
the  consequences  of  a  possible  non  compliance  by  the  merged  entity  with  the 
commitment. The arbitral tribunal may find it necessary to award damages. In doing so, 
the  arbitrators  will  recover  their  ordinary  adjudicatory  function,  i.e.  settle  a  dispute 
between parties. The normal features of such adjudicatory process will apply, such as the 
need to determine the applicable law, e.g. to assess the eventual damages.
16 It  is clear that the arbitration of post-merger commitments has a  dual nature : 
regulatory in a first stage, it may recover its usual function in a second stage.
This  raises  the  question  of  the  exact  nature  of  the  arbitration  contemplated  by  the 
Commission.  It  has  been  said  that  this  type  of  arbitration  was  ‘sui  generis’.  This 
characterization does not help to clarify the mission of the arbitrator.
In reality, it seems that the arbitrators will work, during the first stage of the proceedings, 
under close scrutiny, if not control, of the Commission. The Commission indeed usually 
reserves the right to influence the proceedings, or at least to be kept informed of the 
proceedings.
In  some arbitration  agreements,  the  MTF had required  the  merged entity  to  keep it 
informed of the existence of a dispute and the start of an arbitration proceedings. In other 
instances, the influence of the Commission will concern the nature of the procedure to be 
followed. In the BskyB case, the Commission reserved the right to impose the arbitration 
rules  if  the  parties  could  not  agree  on  the  arbitration  process.  Other  arbitration 
42It seems that the ICC Task Force on Arbitrating Competition Issues (headed by Marc Blessing) will 
consider drafting a list of arbitrators with specific expertise in the field of antitrust arbitration. It may be 
noted  that  the  merged  entity  may  find  it  convenient  to  appoint  the  same  person  every  time  it  is 
confronted with a dispute. This could prove a beneficial strategy.
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agreements gave the Commission a role in the appointment of the arbitrators. Usually, 
the Commission is granted the right to confirm the arbitrators.43
Even though this has not (yet) been expressly provided for in the arbitration agreements, 
one may imagine that the Commission will, at some stage, want to intervene directly in 
the arbitration proceedings. The MTF could file a request to be heard, or at least to file an 
amicus curiae brief, if it finds that this is required. It would be up to the arbitrators to 
appreciate such a request. One would have to find very good reasons to refuse such a 
request. In fact, the assistance of the Commission may be needed. Arbitrating disputes 
relating to post-merger commitments require broad investigation powers, to uncover the 
facts  and all  relevant  materials.  These  powers  may be  available  to  the  investigative 
agencies,  but  will  not  as  such  be  available  to  an  arbitral  tribunal.  This  explains  the 
peculiar rules relating to the burden of proof, to be found in some arbitration agreements. 
Absent such rules, the arbitrators may require the assistance of the Commission to carry 
out their the fact-finding mission.44
17 Given the peculiar nature of the arbitration contemplated by the MTF, one may 
ask whether the influence of the MTF will also extend to the outcome of the dispute. It is 
clear that the MTF will receive a copy of the award.45
Will the MTF take a second look at the award? What will happen if the MTF disagrees 
with  the  findings  of  the  arbitrators?  The  arbitrators  are  naturally  bound  by  the 
Commission’s  decision  on  the  merger  when determining  whether  a  commitment  has 
been breached. The Commission’s decision provides the yardstick for the resolution of 
the dispute. It seems that, since the arbitrator carries out a quasi-regulatory function, he 
cannot  ignore  or  side-step  the  Commission’s  decision.  This  will  help  avoid  major 
differences of opinion between the MTF and the arbitrators.
It is not excluded, however, that the arbitrators come to findings that are not compatible 
with the MTF’s view of the merged entity’s behaviour. There will  be no difficulty if the 
arbitrators have found in favour of the third party competitor, although the MTF was of the 
opinion  that  the  merged  entity’s  behaviour  was  in  conformity  with  the  commitments 
made. In that case, the competition will indeed not suffer. The situation could be more 
delicate if the arbitrators find in favour of the merged entity. The MTF could be of the 
opinion that the merged entity has violated its commitments.
Will  the  Commission  retain  the  last  word  on  the  issues  of  compliance  with  the 
commitments? This would reduce the arbitrators to mere advisors of the MTF, without 
real adjudicatory power. There can be no doubt that a full  review by the MTF of any 
award would be incompatible with the fundamental tenet of arbitration and in particular 
with  the  jurisdictional  nature  of  arbitration.  If  the  MTF  insists  on  arbitration  as  a 
monitoring tool for compliance with commitments, it cannot reserve a right of review or 
confirmation of the award. Any other solution would degrade the arbitration to a mere 
administrative review process outsourced to a third party.
This is not to say that  the Commission cannot intervene by other means. One could 
imagine that, in the most extreme case, the Commission would reserve the possibility to 
challenge the award before national courts. As the EC has held, “[a] national court to 
43See the observation of  CH.  LIEBSCHER,  art.cit.,  J.  Int’l  Arbitration,  2004, (67),  80 :  « As regards the 
selection of arbitrators, it seems doubtful that the Commission will have the necessary knowledge to 
judge a person’s relevant track record and experience”.
44Alternatively, the arbitrators may wish to appoint an expert, for instance an economist, for the purpose 
of ascertaining and evaluating the facts. See generally A. P. KOMNINOS, “Assistance to Arbitral Tribunals 
in the Appliaction of EC Competition Law”, in  in  European Competition Law Annual 2001 : Effective 
Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, C.-D. EHLERMANN, Hart, Oxford, 2003, 364-385.
45As noted by CH. LIEBSCHER, art.cit., J. Int’l Arbitration, 2004, (67), 70 : « It seems that the Commission 
has  not  taken  a  final  position  regarding  the  influence  it  wishes  to  exercise  as  to  the  arbitration 
procedure”
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which an  application  is  made for  annulment  of  an  arbitration award  must  grant  that 
application if it considers that the award in question is in fact contrary to Article 85 of the 
Treaty,  where  its  domestic  rules  of  procedure  require  it  to  grant  an  application  for 
annulment founded on failure to observe national rules of public policy”.46 This type of 
control seems sufficient to prevent the most egregious mistakes.47 There is thus no need 
to provide for a special review mechanism, in the arbitration agreement, under which the 
MTF would act as the ‘step-mother’ of the arbitrators.
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
18 The practice of the MTF to impose arbitration as a monitoring tool to ensure and 
review compliance with post-merger commitments opens a new field for  the world of 
commercial  arbitration.  Lawyers  will  be  required  to  intervene  first  when  drafting  the 
arbitration ‘agreement’ in the negotiation phase with the MTF and further when advising 
client on whether or not to start arbitration proceedings if it appears that one or the other 
commitment has been breached.48
The  preceding  overview  has  shown  that  the  ‘arbitration’  agreements  included  in 
commitment letters often include pathological aspects, which raise the risk of blocking the 
arbitration  altogether.49 This  should  not  come  as  a  surprise,  given  that  arbitration 
agreements  are  often  drafted  at  a  very  late  stage,  when  negotiations  reach  a  final 
climax.50 This also goes to show that the MTF does not (yet) possess sufficient expertise 
in  arbitration and other  dispute resolution methods,  to  master  the fine art  of  drafting 
dispute  resolution  clauses.  This  will  change  in  the  future,  as  the  MTF  acquires  the 
required expertise. Several initiatives will  help in this process, such as  e.g. the model 
arbitration agreement suggested by Marc Blessing.51
These and other issues will be discussed by specialized fora, where specialists from both 
the arbitration and the competition worlds will meet to work out their differences.52
It remains to be seen whether the abstract and general commitments to arbitrate included 
in  some  letters  of  commitment,  will  give  rise  to  actual  disputes  being  arbitrated. 
Unfortunately,  the  Commission  does  not  seem  to  publish  eventual  findings  on  the 
application of the commitments.
46ECJ, Case C-126/97,  Eco-Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV, [1999] ECR I-3055, 
para 41.
47See for this view CH. LIEBSCHER, art.cit., J. Int’l Arbitration, 2004, (67), 70-71.
48Arbitration  and  related  dispute  resolution  methods  can  also  play  other  roles  in  the  processes  of 
mergers and acquisitions, see e.g. A. Sessler and C. Leimert, “The Role of Expert Determination in 
Mergers and Acquisitions under German Law”, Arbitration international, 2004, 151-165.
49One example of such ‘pathological’ aspects of the arbitration clauses is to be found in the fact that, 
although almost all  arbitration agreements provide for a very tight deadline for rendering the award, 
none of the agreements deal with the situation where the award is not rendered within this period of 
time; what happens if the arbitrator is not able to render his decision within the prescribed time period. 
Should he be considered functus officio ?
50On this see the observations of  L.  IDOT,  art.  cit.,  Revue de l’arbitrage,  2000, (591), 599 :  « […] la 
rédaction de ces engagements parfois arrachés à la dernière minute, juste avant l’expiration des délais 
fatidiques […] » and Marc Blessing, who writes about the “last minute creations of some of the rather 
exotic provisions […] which, manifestly, had been devised under great time pressure and without careful 
thinking as to their suitability and workability” (MARC BLESSING,  Arbitrating Antitrust and Merger Control 
Issues, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2003, 169).
51Draft  Model  Commitment  Submitted  to  the  Commission  for  Arbitrating  Behavioural  Undertakings, 
reproduced in  MARC BLESSING,  Arbitrating Antitrust and Merger Control Issues, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 
2003, 186.
52Both the ICC (the ICC Taskforce on Arbitrating Competition Law Issues, chaired by  Marc Blessing) 
and the IAI have set up working groups to study these issues.
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